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DDI - 06690/84
 ACIS - 762/84
 28 November 1984
 Copy 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
 Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Briefing Book for NSPG Meeting [redacted] 25X1

1. This memorandum transmits your briefing book for the National Security Planning Group meeting, now scheduled for 1:45 on Friday, 30 November, in the White House Situation Room. This book contains products by NIO/USSR, NIO/SP, NIO/EUR, and ACIS. [redacted] 25X1

2. The Table of Contents is listed on the left. A set of proposed talking points is at Tab A. [redacted] 25X1

3. This meeting is the first in a series leading to the session on 7-8 January 1985 between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss Soviet near-term and long-term interests in arms control arrangements with the US. A second NSPG meeting appears to be intended for the week of 3 December. My understanding is that this second meeting will address comparable US interests. [redacted] 25X1

4. With your concurrence, my plan is to update this book by COB Thursday, 29 November, after the meeting with you and several NIO's in your office Thursday afternoon. [redacted] 25X1

5. Also with your concurrence, my plan is to have NIO/SP and NIO/USSR in the briefing with me in order to answer any detailed questions the attendees might have. Moreover, I believe strongly that once the briefing is over, the three of us should leave the meeting and allow the NSPG members to continue without us. [redacted] 25X1

6. In the meantime, if we can do more to assist you, please call. [redacted] 25X1

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Attachments: [redacted]
 This MEMORANDUM is CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
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 are removed.

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Proposed DCI Talking Points for NSPG Meeting, 30 November

-- The substantive keys to renewed strategic arms control talks with the USSR are:

- o US objectives, near- and far-term.
- o The linkage the US uses between nuclear weapons and outer space activities (ASAT, SDI, and other uses--such as reconnaissance, et al).

USSR:

- Gromyko probably will arrive in Geneva with specific ideas about the modalities of the renewed negotiations and a politically-based agenda, including a strong effort "to halt the arms race" in space, possibly hinting that progress in nuclear arms reductions will only be possible if SDI and ASAT are limited.
- The Soviets will have a concept ready on modalities but will seek US ideas first. The Soviets probably envision separate negotiations on space and nuclear weapons.
- Gromyko will probably use his March visit to Holland to feed Dutch anti-INF sentiments. He may press for a moratorium on INF deployments, possibly in exchange for a freeze or even unilateral reductions in INF systems in Europe and the USSR. The Soviets will manipulate the SS-20 force to influence the Europeans.

Europe:

- The West Europeans welcome the probable resumption of US-Soviet arms control talks. Their primary objective will be to ensure that INF talks not lag behind START.
- The possible resumption of INF talks, however, complicates anew INF deployments and will probably result in maneuverings by various governments (e.g., Netherlands and Belgium) and arms control constituencies to pressure us into a quick agreement with the Soviets.
- The exact course taken by European governments, however, will depend primarily on the US management of the Alliance; e.g., presentation of its positions in Allied councils.

US

- Moreover, the Soviets are aware the talks will begin just prior to a new Congress convening. The Soviets know the Administration's political margin has decreased slightly.

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Overview of US Policy Work

A working group chaired by Lt. General Chain (State/PM) has been meeting privately to prepare papers for the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) and NSPG. By next Monday (3 December) the working group will provide a paper from the following outline:

- I. US national security objective 1994 (prepared by OSD)
- II. Soviet Goals and Expectations at Geneva (prepared by CIA)
- III. US approach to Geneva
 - a. Introduction
 - b. General US Arms Control Objectives
 - c. Summaries of Current US Objectives on Specific Issues
 1. Strategic Systems
 2. Theater Nuclear Systems
 3. ASAT
 4. SDI
 5. Chemical Weapons
 6. Nuclear Testing
 7. Conventional Arms
- IV. Process - what do we do at Geneva

At this time negotiating options will not be included in the paper.

The paper will be handled in a special access program (SAP) established and operated by State/PM ~~at~~ Bud McFarlane's request. The details of the SAP will be handled separately later.

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29 November 1984

Soviet Goals and Expectations at Geneva

While they have agreed in principle to begin new arms control talks, the Soviets appear concerned that the US is interested more in the appearance of negotiations than in addressing specific Soviet concerns, particularly in the area they have identified as a priority concern--outer space. Moreover, having reversed their intransigent position of refusing to enter into further arms control negotiations until US LRINF are removed from Europe, and, in their perspective, taken the initiative for beginning talks, the Soviets may now believe that they are once again well-positioned to put the US on the political defensive in the public arena.

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Thus, the Soviets most likely view the Geneva meeting as an opportunity to ascertain whether the US is prepared to engage in substantive bargaining on terms that Moscow can live with. In particular, Gromyko will want to determine whether the US is prepared to discuss concrete limitations on space weapons before committing the USSR to formal negotiations on offensive arms reductions.

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Gromyko will also expect to hear a clarification of the US proposal for "umbrella" talks. While cautiously exploring US proposals, Gromyko likely will have his own ideas as to the modalities for the negotiations and a politically based agenda to include the goal of halting the arms race, particularly in space weaponry. A key objective of the Soviet emphasis on "demilitarizing" space is to undermine support for US strategic defense, in general, and the SDI, in particular. The Soviets probably see a distinct possibility that through a combination of arms control efforts, their active measures campaign, independent political and budget pressures within the US, and pressure from US Allies, the Administration's efforts to obtain congressional funding for SDI will be impeded and the program curtailed.

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Gromyko will give priority to negotiations on space weapons. He will seek further clarification of the Administration's offer to consider "appropriate mutual restraints" during the negotiations and seek US commitment to an ASAT moratorium before specific negotiations begin. He probably will indicate that progress on the demilitarization of space will facilitate reaching an agreement on offensive nuclear arms and may go as far to suggest that an agreement on strategic nuclear arms cannot be achieved absent an agreement on space weapons. The Soviets probably view the goal of blocking US ASAT testing, which they consider integral to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), as being more urgent than reaching an agreement on limiting offensive nuclear arms. They may hope to use US interest in a strategic arms control accord as bargaining leverage to achieve their negotiation objectives on space weapons. Gromyko may argue that the implementation of SDI will undermine the ABM Treaty and he might assert that any future arms control agreement depends on maintaining the integrity of this agreement.

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The Soviets are well positioned in the near term to compete militarily in the arena of strategic offensive arms. Nonetheless, we believe they still attach priority, both for political and military reasons, to the maintenance of negotiated constraints on US nuclear forces. They have expressed concern that the US might abandon SALT II restrictions when the treaty expires next year. Gromyko may seek a mutual reaffirmation that the sides will continue to observe the treaty constraints until a new agreement can be negotiated. He may indicate that a new strategic arms agreement is possible, providing that basic framework of the SALT II Treaty is taken as point of departure.

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While the Soviets may offer some adjustments to their current strategic arms control proposals, they are unlikely to demonstrate significant flexibility on the fundamental issues which divide the US and USSR in the START and INF negotiations unless perhaps the US makes a significant concession on SDI or ASAT. They are likely to insist that French and British nuclear systems must be taken into account "somewhere" in the negotiations, to resist US attempts to reduce their heavy ICBM missile force, and reject proposals calling for on site inspection. On INF, they have dropped their precondition that US INF missiles be withdrawn before negotiations begin but are likely to press for a monitoring on further deployments and a commitment that a reversal of those deployments can be negotiated. Gromyko may suggest that a ban on long range sea-launched cruise missiles (SCLMs) is no longer feasible in light of US deployments and press for a US agreement to negotiate a limit on these systems.

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The Soviets will have a clear-cut idea of their own as to the format and modalities of the negotiations. Gromyko may wait for the US to show its hand and describe the "umbrella" proposal but the other "concrete ideas" we have told them we are prepared to discuss before making concrete counter-proposals. The Soviets may envisage two sets of negotiations--one on space weapons and one on nuclear arms--the characterization which they used in the joint communique. Chernenko has stated that these are "interconnected" issues, possibly hinting that negotiations will be successful only if progress is made in both arenas.

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Until the Soviets are satisfied on the subject and objectives of further negotiations, the Soviets may see some utility in having an extended series of foreign ministers meetings in lieu of formal negotiations. They might calculate that under these circumstances, public expectations in the United States and Western Europe would increase pressure on the Administration to make "good faith" gestures of unilateral restraint.

- The Soviets may hope to stimulate further domestic and congressional pressure to postpone ASAT testing in the interest of reaching an ASAT agreement with the Soviet Union.
- The Soviets may view the Dutch basing decision in November and recent political discord in Belgium over the INF issue as offering opportunities to derail US deployments in those countries.

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- Gromyko is scheduled in March to visit the Netherlands and possibly Belgium and the FRG, and he may propose a moratorium on further US INF deployments in return for a freeze or possibly unilateral reductions in the Soviet SS-20 force in the European USSR.

At this meeting with the Secretary, Gromyko may touch on other arms control issues, possibly calling for the ratification of existing treaties on nuclear testing and a resumption of the comprehensive test ban negotiations. He will also probably revive the Soviet call for a "freeze" on nuclear weapons testing and deployments during negotiations and call on the US to sign a no first use declaration.

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The Director of Central Intelligence
 Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06641-84
 26 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
 Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
 National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: The Soviets Grab the Umbrella

1. The Soviets have decided to engage in the umbrella arms control exchange in a remarkable, but not surprising, tactical switch from the stone-wall policies followed with almost uniform consistency since the end of last year. Their aim is no less than to encourage a substantial redirection of the Administration's policies in its second term. Soviet commentaries -- the most recent and comprehensive current example is attached -- lay out for internal audiences why this is worth a try:

The stress on "new talks", not resumption of the old ones, makes it possible to resume negotiations without explicitly repudiating past positions, such as no talks on INF without reversal of US INF deployments.

The world has learned that the "language of force" and "positions of strength" will not force Soviet concessions. Read: Moscow's hanging tough for the past year paid off after all.

President Reagan is being pulled in the opposite directions of "playing the peacemaker" or "returning to the course of confrontation". He currently leans toward the former role.

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Washington is in the throes of political battle which will determine the future US line, whose outcome cannot be assured, but which, by implication, ought to be influenced by active Soviet political tactics.

Meanwhile, US allies, domestic opinion, and economic conditions have generated pressure that could modify Administration behavior in the next four years.

Firm Soviet pursuit of "its principled line" has contributed to this pressure and created a potentially new situation. Resumption of talks does not represent a Soviet concession, but response to opportunity -- which will be very cautiously explored.

2. There is a certain amount of rationalization in these arguments. They are crafted to reassure skeptics within the Soviet elite, among whom there are surely many, that these talks will not put Moscow on the slippery slope to unnecessary concessions, but offer the chance of coaxing Washington onto it. It is unlikely that these rationalizations will be entirely persuasive. We can expect in coming weeks to see implicit questioning on the part of such skeptics as to who is going to take advantage of whom ("kto kovo", or "who gets whom" as Lenin put it) in these talks and the process that follows.

3. Underlying these arguments is the pragmatic recognition that you can't make money at political poker by staying out of every hand. With the President massively reelected and the Soviet bureaucracy convinced, according to many good reports, that the previous policy had run its course, it is now time to rejoin the game.

4. It is worth note that a Soviet Politburo evidently beset by vigorous internal politicking over succession has been able to make this tactical adjustment quite handily. It is equally significant that the process of adjustment coincided with the reassertion of Chernenko's political status. This coincidence should not be read as proof of Chernenko's detentist proclivities, at least for the moment. Rather his reemergence damped prospects for an immediate succession and permitted the Politburo to get some other business done. All reporting about his current authority indicates that Gromyko must have had a decisive voice in the Soviet decision.

5. The Soviet decision to reengage the Reagan Administration does not represent a fundamental or strategic change of foreign policy line. So far, it is a sensible tactical shift in dealing with a US administration that will be around for another four years and clearly wants its second term marked by better US-Soviet relations or, at least, earnest attempts to get them. The Soviets have certainly heard Bud McFarlane's assurance that the President is committed to getting arms control results before he leaves office. This sets them up for playing hard to get.

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
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6. In the months ahead, we can expect the Soviets to be more active on many fronts to influence the political setting in which the US decides its negotiating positions in new arms control talks and, equally important, the contents of the rest of its national security agenda: military budgets and programs, and policy toward regional security matters such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. With arms control talks once again in prospect or progress, the Soviets expect they will have better prospects to influence this agenda than they did over the past year, or possibly the past four years.

7. Playing this game does not require a lot of decisiveness in Moscow given its advantages of secrecy and its ability to pursue several seemingly contradictory tactical lines at once. Chernenko has made plain that the larger objective of the game -- admittedly a long shot, but worth a try -- is to get back to the "experience of the '70s" and to detente as "the natural state" of US-Soviet relations. Such a condition would tend to spare the Soviet leadership the necessity of more fundamental choices in foreign, military, and domestic affairs, or at least to delay the need for fundamental choice. That would be tailor made for this Soviet leadership.


Fritz W. Ermhart

Attachment: As Stated

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NIO/USSR

DCI/NIO MEETING
21 NOVEMBER 1984

SOVIET DESIRE FOR ARMS TALKS TO INFLUENCE US DEFENSE PROGRAMS

A primary Kremlin objective in the near term will be to elicit US participation in arms control talks. In the context of the Soviets' long term strategy of using arms control as another instrument to gain and maintain advantages, they probably believe the next six months are a particularly important window for influencing US defense programs. The neo-Brezhnevite leadership, which regularly recalls with fondness detente as practiced in the early 1970s, probably believes that a positive arms control dialogue can influence the Congress and others to treat US defense issues with lesser urgency.

- o They now want to maximize pressure on the Congress to cut defense spending as we come to grips with the deficit.
- o They may believe SDI and the MX are particularly vulnerable.
- o They probably hope that a setback to US military spending this year would halt and even reverse the momentum of the Administration's defense program over the next several years.

The Soviets are further interested to undermine US defense spending at this time because of their serious economic problems and aversion to major economic restructuring. They are at or near the end of a long economic policy cul de sac, and the implications for their defense goals are bad. Saturday's Washington Post article relating that Chernenko called for a boost in Soviet defense spending at last week's expanded Politburo meeting was wrong.

- o What was noteworthy about Chernenko's comments was how little he said about defense spending and the near backhanded treatment he did give it.
- o The speech was replete with lamentation about Soviet economic difficulties and exhortation to overcome these problems.
- o Chernenko's preaching on behalf of consumers denotes considerable concern to improve living standards and, implicitly, even some anxiety about public feelings toward the regime.
- o Editorials in Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda in September suggested a leadership decision against diverting resources from consumer programs to defense, and a more recent Novoye Vremya article explaining the Soviet defense budget had a very defensive tone.

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Arms talks leading to reduced US defense programs would reduce the pressure on the Soviets to divert scarce resources to defense and allow the Soviets greater leeway to deal with their economic problems.

Moscow, in its desire for a negotiation on SDI, probably is resigned to talks that also include INF. Because the Soviets now want to improve the East-West climate and prospects for talks, they did not claim that the US ASAT test last week violated the terms of their current test moratorium or otherwise condemn it vitriolically. Insofar as their momentary concern is to restart and politically utilize the arms talks process, they probably are not now focussing as much on possible outcomes. This may be particularly true of Chernenko, whose words and tones -- in the Washington Post interview and the more recent one with NBC -- hail directly from the Brezhnev school of moderate, placating rhetoric.

The Soviets also are likely to utilize high level visits and exchanges to foster a positive climate. These may include:

- o A possible visit to Moscow by Secretary Shultz.
- o A visit to Moscow by a US trade delegation in January.

A corollary to Soviet interest in arms talks and other diplomatic instruments as a means of influencing US defense programs, and relatedly US domestic attitudes toward international affairs generally, is a probable disinclination among the leadership at this time to act provocatively toward the US.

- o This would seem to be a time when the Kremlin would not send MiGs to Nicaragua.
- o This might be a good time for the Allies to press the Soviets to curtail their restrictions on access to Berlin.

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TIME/DECEMBER 3, 1984

Back on Speaking Terms

Hinting at a thaw, the U.S. and Soviets agree to meet in Geneva

In nature, when masses of ice begin to melt, then fissure, they can make a sort of thunder, a great bass popping that echoes for miles. It is a startling noise. In Washington and Moscow last week there was a similarly surprising noise that sounded, just maybe, like the first tremors of a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. It came Thanksgiving Day, with officials in each country reading identical statements to reporters. At the White House, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane delivered the tidings deadpan. "The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations," he reported. "with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer-space arms."

One year after the Soviets abandoned parallel sets of negotiations in Geneva on

strategic arms (START) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), they have decided to come in from the cold. On the first Monday in January, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Shultz are to sit down together in Geneva and begin working out the basic ground rules and agenda for a whole new set of weapons talks. Said a senior Western diplomat in Moscow: "There are powerful interests on both sides in having these negotiations succeed."

It is just a beginning, a first step toward determining how substantive arms-control talks might proceed. All the hard parts come later. When the two sides get down to particulars, they might again find themselves in a deadlock, the Soviets as intransigent as ever on the issue of medium-range Euromissiles, the Americans as uncompromising as before on land-based

missiles. Declares one Administration arms-control advocate: "What is important is the details, the specifics of approach from January on. What is the U.S. ready, willing and able to put on the table?" A moderate colleague is also pessimistic. "Reagan wants to see it as a thaw," he says of the Geneva get-together, "but unless we can show them we are serious about the arms-control process, then this isn't the beginning of anything." In fact, the Reagan Administration is profoundly divided over how to handle arms talks, and has not yet fashioned anything like a clear and coherent negotiating strategy. That process is complicated by a furious debate within the Administration over Soviet compliance with existing arms treaties (see following story).

Nevertheless, the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, with its explicit goal of getting arms control back on track, is the single most hopeful bit of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations since the now moribund START discussions got under way more than two years ago. When President Reagan was told about the Geneva plans last Monday at his Santa Barbara ranch, recalls McFarlane, his response was simple and apt. "This is good news," Reagan said.

Indeed, for the President the news should be especially welcome, since it seems to vindicate, for the moment, his 1984 hard-liner-turned-peacemaker approach. The Kremlin had declared repeatedly that unless newly deployed Pershing II and cruise missiles were removed from Western Europe, there would be no further Soviet participation in nuclear-arms-control talks—period. Despite the threat, however, nearly 100 of the NATO missiles have been installed this year, and deployment continues. Says Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle: "The Soviets made the key concession by returning to negotiations without preconditions."

Their return required a semantic sleight of hand. The Soviets would not simply rejoin the suspended Geneva talks, so last week's announcement very carefully called the impending talks "new negotiations." What about START and INF? "As far as those negotiations go, the situation has not changed," said Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vladimir Lomeiko at his Moscow press conference. "They

Gromyko: after some semantic sleight of hand, the Soviets are coming in from the cold



At noon on Thanksgiving Day, McFarlane delivers the good news to Washington reporters

are only possible given the removal of the American missiles." He was emphatic. "This is not a renewal of negotiations. These are absolutely new talks." Explains a U.S. official: "The Soviets had painted themselves into a very public corner. We wanted to give them an easy way out." Not that the Soviets have crumpled. In the past year they have deployed almost 100 SS-20s, capable of hitting targets throughout Western Europe.

Nuclear weapons are the central fact of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But incipient entente, although modest, is also showing up elsewhere. Mikhail Gorbachev, heir apparent to Soviet Leader Konstantin Chernenko, will visit Britain for a week in December (see box). As Shultz arrives in Geneva in January, a U.S. Commerce official will be in Moscow for quieter talks about how to expand U.S.-Soviet trade. This week Soviet Minister of Agriculture Valentin Mesyats will begin a twelve-day tour of the American heartland; aside from Gromyko, no Soviet minister has visited the U.S. since 1979. Last week Pop Singer John Denver embarked on a concert tour of the Soviet Union, the first by an American entertainer in years. When Denver appeared at the U.S. Ambassador's Thanksgiving dinner in Moscow and sang *We're All in This Together*, one Soviet guest, Foreign Ministry Official Alexander Bessmertnykh, sang right along.

It is no rush of good-fellowship that has the Soviets packing for Geneva again. Rather, the past year made it plain that their attitude of aggrieved peevishness was getting them nowhere. When the NATO governments were staunch in their determination to install new Pershing II and cruise missiles, the disarmament movement in Europe withered, and with it a good part of Moscow's hopes for forestalling the deployments. The Soviets meanwhile heard increasingly come-hither

er talk from the President and realized by summer that his re-election was all but certain. "They faced four more years of Ronald Reagan," explains a U.S. policy-maker. "So the time had come to find a way back to the negotiating table."

A few days after re-election, Reagan sent an earnest note to Chernenko. A week later, surprisingly swift for the Soviet bu-

reaucracy, the White House received a letter from Chernenko proposing the Shultz-Gromyko conference. "There had been positive signals," says a presidential adviser, "but nothing this explicit." Perle, probably the most influential arms-control critic in the Administration, had his calculations thrown off. Said he: "I'm amazed the Soviets came back to the table so soon. I hadn't expected them until spring."

The breakthrough came after Reagan suggested vaguely, during his speech in September to the U.N. General Assembly, that new arms talks might take place under an "umbrella," implying a unified forum without separate negotiations for medium-range missiles and long-range missiles. The START talks had concerned the warheads, mostly loaded on ICBMs, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have pointed at each other from their respective territories and from submarines. The INT talks focused exclusively on missiles based in Europe and aimed at European targets. Umbrella talks could treat those different weapons as parts of a single negotiating equation, together with emerging space-based weapons. The technical complexity of the talks would be increased, yet the comprehensive approach offers considerable advantages: negotiators would be able to barter the putative U.S. edge in space weaponry, for instance, directly with the Soviet surfeit in ICBM megatonnage.

What kinds of specific offers might



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the U.S. make for openers? Shultz could agree to a slowdown in the deployment of cruise missiles or a moratorium on testing antisatellite devices. The hard-liners in Washington, unwilling to forgo the U.S. buildup in either area, would merely suggest that the Soviets send monitors to watch U.S. underground nuclear tests and that an American counterpart go to the U.S.S.R.

The Administration's internal split on arms control remains so deep that significant progress may not be possible despite the President's accommodating intentions. On one side are the skeptics: Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Perle and other Pentagon subordinates. Arrayed against them are the arms-control moderates: Shultz, his underlings and the White House staff. Even at the White House meetings last week to shape the U.S.-Soviet joint statement, admits a Pentagon official, the hawks practiced "constant skirmishing" to slow the momentum.

For their separate political reasons, the principal moderates and hard-liners agree that no arms-control czar should be appointed. But McFarlane talked last week of finding someone "to advise, to troubleshoot and to be a designated hitter

that could assure momentum is sustained." The White House favorite for the job is Paul Nitze, the chief negotiator at the INF talks. Yet he is opposed by the Pentagon hawks. In Moscow, one Soviet expert on U.S. relations smiled at the Washington jargon—czar—but said with a sigh, "When Kissinger was making these decisions in the Nixon years, then we were able to move ahead. Maybe what we need is a new Kissinger."

Nixon met three times with Leonid Brezhnev, first in 1972 to sign the SALT I pact. McFarlane said it was "premature to speculate" that the January meeting might lead to a Reagan-Chernenko encounter. Before last week's announcement, Chernenko told NBC News in answer to written questions that he did not think "conditions now are ripe for a Soviet-American summit meeting." Still, U.S. officials have bandied about the idea of a summit next fall.

Before any such grand encounter can occur, though, Reagan must involve himself in the arms-control process more directly. Specifically, he will have to give Shultz and the moderates his unequivocal endorsement, or make it clear to the hard-liners that

his commitment to negotiating nuclear arms reductions is genuine and urgent.

Even if the President manages to establish a single negotiating strategy for his Administration, arms-control agreements will surely be elusive. Chernenko's health and his mastery of the Soviet state remain uncertain. The Kremlin may simply want to observe the forms of negotiation for propaganda purposes. "We're not there yet," concedes a White House adviser, with epic understatement. "It may take the whole second term to get there."

In Washington, Moscow and European capitals last week, the general reaction was the same, a kind of prudent hopefulness, positive but well short of jubilant. The distance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had become vast and worrisome. Even an uncertain plan to re-engage is better than hostile solitude. "The main thing is that the talks are taking place," sums up Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary. "But don't let's have any terrifically high expectations of sudden change. It's going to be a very long business. It will require a lot of patience from all of us." —By Kurt Andersen. Reported by Erik Amftastrol/Moscow and Johanna McGahey/Washington, with other bureaus

An Opening to London

Word that the superpowers would hold talks early next year in Geneva was the second sign that the Kremlin is looking for a diplomatic opening to the West. The first was that Mikhail Gorbachev, 53, the fast-rising heir apparent to President Konstantin Chernenko, will lead a Soviet delegation to Britain in mid-December. Gorbachev's trip will mark the first visit of a top-ranking Soviet leader to Britain in eight years. For Gorbachev, who has already seen more of the West than all but a few Politburo members, the visit might be the dress rehearsal for a later trip to the U.S.

Gorbachev accepted Britain's invitation in his capacity as chairman of the foreign affairs commission of the Supreme Soviet, the U.S.S.R.'s largely ceremonial parliament. Last year he led another parliamentary delegation on a two-week tour of Canada, impressing his hosts with a lively intelligence and the ability to listen carefully. British diplomats were delighted with his latest travel plans. "If he really is the Kremlin's No. 2 man, we want to see as much of him as possible," explained a British diplomat. "And we want him to see as much of us as possible."

Gorbachev is likely to do just that, given the limitations of a one-week stay. Besides attending parliamentary functions, he will presumably want to inspect some farms and agricultural-equipment factories; agriculture is one of his responsibilities in the Kremlin. Most important, he will be received at 10 Downing Street, possibly more than once. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who has been hinting publicly for 14 months that she would welcome talks with the Soviet leadership, noted that Gorbachev's visit will be followed by one from



Gorbachev: Lively Intelligence

Gromyko early in 1985. Said Thatcher: "We shall hope during these visits to take forward the search for ways to reduce the burden of armaments." Acting in concert with Washington, the British may use their time with Gorbachev to sound out the opening Soviet position in Geneva and to hint at Washington's. "The Russians know perfectly well that anything they say to us will go straight back to Washington," said a British diplomat in London. "We will be acting as a two-way conduit."

The unexpected acceptance of London's invitation by Gorbachev recalled another Soviet foreign policy initiative staged on British soil. In 1956, during the cold war, Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin came calling, opening a campaign of personal diplomacy in the West that culminated in Khrushchev's 1959 tour of the U.S. That was also a period of progress in arms-control negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet Union, though no major agreement emerged until the limited test-ban treaty of 1963.

Gorbachev was conspicuous by his absence from a Nov. 15 meeting of the ruling Politburo. A Soviet journalist joked that Gorbachev was busy taking an intensive tea-sipping course in case the Queen Mother invited him over. "Whether or not to use the strainer, how to put the napkin on your knee, and all that," the journalist mused. More serious Soviet officials went out of their way to assure British officials that Gorbachev was merely on vacation and that his British travel plans remain unchanged. Their explanation was plausible: Gorbachev filled in for Chernenko during the President's extended summer vacation and remained at his desk throughout the fall. As for Gorbachev's plans beyond December, nothing is firm. But Western diplomats have lately been speculating about a possible Gorbachev trip to the U.S. in 1985.

Back to the Table

Reagan and Chernenko agree to arms talks, but the road will be long and tough.

Turkeys were already browning across the country last week when Washington and Moscow supplied their own Thanksgiving Day treat. In simultaneous press briefings, the superpowers announced that Secretary of State George Shultz will meet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva on Jan. 7 and 8. The surprise was that the two sides had already agreed to revive nuclear arms talks; they left their emissaries to dicker over an agenda. John Denver even showed up at the U.S. ambassador's home in Moscow to sing "we're all in this together"—as the ambassador, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official and other Thanksgiving guests chirped along in harmony.

And with that accord, the Kremlin leadership blinked: they ended a year of frosty confrontation, buried their preconditions—and handed Ronald Reagan his first postelection diplomatic coup. Even at best, the Thanksgiving Day surprise lit only a dim light at

the beginning of the tunnel. In Geneva, Shultz and Gromyko must somehow script negotiations on long-range strategic missiles, European-based warheads, space weapons or some combination of all three (chart). Gromyko will likely table a familiar Soviet wish list—including a demand that the United States stop deploying its new NATO missiles in Europe. Needless to say, Washington has a quarrel with every point. A senior administration official emphasizes that "these are going to be long, tough negotiations, with no guarantee of success."

Allies: That renders no less dramatic Reagan's own late-blooming commitment to arms control. He spent most of his first term lambasting the Evil Empire. He launched his futile first-term talks more to please the allies than to reach agreement. But by re-election time he was meeting Gromyko in person to demonstrate that term two will belong to arms control. After his victory, Reagan wrote to assure Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko that he is serious. Next, in forums large and small, Reagan persuaded his own administration that he intends to break the impasse with Moscow. The message: in term two, the impetus for arms control will flow from the president

down—complicating matters for the Pentagon hard-liners who will oppose the talks.

So far, the results have vindicated Reagan. He resisted election-year pressures to lure the Soviets back to the bargaining table with U.S. concessions. Instead, his prediction proved correct: the Soviets came back anyway. The Thanksgiving Day accord foresees negotiations on "the whole range" of nuclear and space weapons. That meshes with Washington's preference that offensive and defensive weapons alike be discussed. At least for now, it ignores Moscow's demand that space weapons top the agenda. The formula even sets aside the most explicit Soviet precondition: that talks cannot resume until the United States removes its new NATO missiles from Europe.

If Reagan's stress on arms control proves a political winner, it will ease congressional passage of his hard-line defense budgets and MX missile program. But it will also shift stewardship of his foreign policy to moderates like Shultz, national-security adviser Robert McFarlane—and perhaps a new

high-level "special envoy" such as arms negotiator Paul Nitze. The moderates already are pondering ways to keep the Soviets talking. To that end, the United States might be willing to compromise on its proposal that the two sides merely resume the stalled Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe. The administration would consider merging the START and INF talks—and even tacking on negotiations on space weapons.

On substance, as well, the moderates are considering the kinds of gestures that Pentagon hard-liners vigorously oppose. In strategic-arms talks, some officials are urging that the United States bend toward the Soviet formula for measuring strategic forces—that is, counting launchers, an easier chore than counting actual warheads and megatonnage. In the talks on intermediate-range forces, furthermore, some State Department experts advocate a three-year, bilateral freeze on deployment of new missiles aimed at targets in Europe pending negotiations; on the Soviet side, the freeze would cover triple-warhead SS-20s, the main threat, as well as shorter-range SS-21s and SS-22s. These moderates also propose a similar mor-



SUBJECT: Weapons to destroy satellites.


STATUS: Last June, the Soviets proposed talks but have rejected U.S. insistence on discussing offensive missiles, too.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES: The Soviet Union, which has deployed a crude ASAT system, wants to halt U.S. development of a more sophisticated satellite killer.

SUBJECT: Reducing long-range nuclear weapons.

STATUS: Soviets have refused to meet since December 1983.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES: The U.S. wants to concentrate on heavy, multiple-warhead missiles. Soviets say this discriminates against their reliance on such missiles.



10

atorium on testing antisatellite weapons. With the president and the political winds favoring the moderates, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, his Assistant Secretary Richard Perle and other arms-control critics have kept a low profile. As they see it, the policy battle will heat up when the administration must face tough choices. In the near term, the hard-liners hope they can derail any proposal to forgo American antisatellite tests during negotiations. In the long run they believe that the trends work in their favor. For one thing, negotiators will have trouble keeping up with the rapid expansion of weapons technology. Even if they hammer out some agreement, the hard-liners believe its provisions will prove impossible to verify—and that any arms-control deal will turn out to be fatally flawed.

Saub: There is another uncertainty: the Soviets agreed to nothing on Thanksgiving that they could not undo by Valentine's Day. The Kremlin may intend simply to rail at Reagan from across the table rather than from afar. But the fact is that Moscow's snub treatment utterly failed to prevent the NATO buildup or Reagan's re-election. And it did not address Moscow's more serious anxieties—including the U.S. lead in space weapons, its highly accurate D-5 missiles launched from Trident submarines and the proliferation of U.S. Pershing II missiles in Europe. In the circumstances, Moscow might be genuinely ready to give negotiations another chance. "Of course, Ronald Reagan will remain Ronald Reagan," wrote columnist Fyodor Burlatsky, "but for all that, one mustn't exclude the possibility of certain correctives in the realization of this line... We shall see."

The Kremlin's softer line probably owes

as much to internal politics as to strategic philosophy. The tough talk that pervaded the spring and summer months came at a time when Gromyko and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov played particularly prominent roles. But in recent months, the Army's aggressive Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov has been ousted, and Ustinov himself has taken ill. More important, President Chernenko has asserted himself after a summer of poor health—and history shows that only a strong Soviet leader can unite the nation's bureaucracy behind an arms-control agree-

ment. In fact, the future of U.S.-Soviet relations now lies in the hands of elderly presidents in Moscow and Washington alike. Each has been criticized as "disengaged." Neither has ever before shown much interest or enthusiasm for arms control. Now each has taken a big first step.

Reagan and Chernenko still have to prove that they can walk the last mile to arms control. In exhorting his own team to pursue an agreement, the American president has acted less the take-charge leader than the "benevolent, loving, caring father figure trying to get these very strong personalities to work together," as one aide put it. As last

week's drama unfolded, Reagan gave most of his attention to the 800-foot irrigation system he was digging in the pasture beside his ranch home. Reagan has always preferred sketching the big picture to slogging through details—the fatherly chat to knocking heads together. Now he has committed his prestige to the most dangerous, arcane reaches of the superpower relationship. He still has to prove that his style of laid-back diplomacy can produce progress. But knowing Reagan, nobody's betting against him.

STEVEN STRASSER with JOHN WALCOTT
in Washington and ROBERT B. CULLEN in Moscow

SUBJECT: Limiting the deployment of medium-range missiles aimed at targets in Europe.

STATUS: Soviets walked out of talks in November 1983.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES: The Soviets have refused to consider any agreement that would permit NATO to deploy Pershing II or cruise missiles, and have insisted that British and French missiles be "taken into account" in the talks.



Questions About Soviet Cheating

Future talks could hinge on compliance with old treaties

Does the Soviet Union cheat on the agreements that Leonid Brezhnev signed with Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s? Should the Reagan Administration feel bound by those agreements?

Those questions, and their answers, are closely linked, and President Reagan must face up to them squarely—and very soon. By the end of this week, the White House is required, under a Pentagon authorization bill, to give the Senate Armed Services Committee a report on Soviet compliance with past agreements. By early next year, the Administration must decide on the second question, whether the U.S. should continue to abide by the old SALT agreements while it seeks to negotiate new treaties in the talks that Secretary of State George Shultz plans to propose to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January.

As on most other arms-control issues, the Administration is sharply divided over what these reports should say. Hard-liners, whose most determined and skillful representative is Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, are pressing for the most damning, categorical interpretation of any available evidence that the Soviets have flagrantly violated SALT. Their charges of Soviet cheating buttress their broader case that arms control, at least as practiced traditionally, is not in the national interest. Moderates, centered at the State Department, are inclined to a more equivocal—and, they believe, a more subtle and accurate—reading of the Soviet record. They tend to avoid stark references to violations and talk instead about “questionable activities.” The State Department, according to one of its officials, “has been seeking a report that raises tough questions without overstating the answers.”

Shultz and his advisers have an ulterior motive. They want to protect the President’s diplomatic options. Reagan has said repeatedly that he hopes to reach an arms-control agreement with the U.S.S.R. in his second term. But if his Administration officially renders a guilty verdict against the U.S.S.R. on the issue of compliance, the prospects for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting and future negotiations and agreements may be bleaker than ever. The Soviets will take the accusations as proof that the U.S. is looking for a pretext to scuttle arms control once and for all, while making the Soviets take the blame. At


the same time, Congress and public opinion will be extremely skeptical about the wisdom of continuing to do any business with convicted cheaters.

Caught in the middle of the intramural debate is the intelligence community. Its photoreconnaissance specialists and weapons analysts are the gumshoes who stake out the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. But these detectives are concerned about protecting their “sources and methods” as well as catching the crooks. The CIA is anxious that the Penta-

pant, has been “a knock-down, drag-out, blood-on-the-floor free-for-all.”

There is plenty of room for honest disagreement on the issue of Soviet compliance. Judgments depend on close calls over esoteric technical matters and fine points in treaty language. The whole problem has been complicated by the deterioration of political relations between the superpowers, the stagnation of the arms-control process and the onrush of technology. New weapons systems tend not to fit neatly into the definitions and stipulations drafted as long as twelve years ago. Says Michael Krepon, an expert on compliance issues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “The Soviets usually exploit ambiguities in treaties, and arms-control critics immediately label these Soviet practices as violations.”

Since 1972, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been exchanging private complaints about whether their military programs comply with SALT. They have been doing so behind closed doors in Geneva, in a joint Soviet-American body called the Standing Consultative Commission. Before Reagan came into office, the U.S. had taken many challenges of Soviet practices to the SCC; the Soviets either adequately explained them or discontinued them. Recently, however, the Soviets have been playing closer to the edge of what is permissible, and have perhaps stepped over that edge. Two examples are particularly disturbing, and they are Exhibits A and B in the hard-liners’ case:



Test launch of an MX from Air Force base in California
One new missile is allowed, but does Moscow have two?

gon hard-liners, in their zeal to prosecute the Soviets in public, will give away sensitive intelligence secrets about how much the U.S. knows and how it knows it. Some intelligence experts also interpret the data about Soviet activities as being more ambiguous than the hard-liners want to assert.

As chairman of an interagency review process, the President’s National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, has had the difficult task of trying to hammer out a consensus on Soviet compliance that will balance these conflicting bureaucratic interests and be responsive to the Senate while not undercutting the President’s stated desire to resume serious arms-control negotiations with the U.S.S.R. next year. The process, according to a partici-

pant, has been “a knock-down, drag-out, blood-on-the-floor free-for-all.”

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By 1983, American spy satellites had spotted a huge construction project near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. It looks suspiciously like a giant radar station that would be useful for providing early warning against a missile attack and could also help shoot down the incoming warheads with ABMs. Its location deep inside the U.S.S.R. would make it a clear-cut violation of SALT if it is used for early warning, since the ABM treaty says that such facilities must be near the periphery of the country.

The Soviets claim that the radar,

which will not be completed until 1988 or 1989, is not for looking outward toward the Pacific Ocean for enemy missile warheads, but for looking upward to track satellites and manned vehicles in space, a function permitted by SALT. Whenever the U.S. presses them on the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviets say two new early-warning radars that the U.S. is building in Texas and Georgia violate SALT because their wide sweep covers much of the continental U.S. and therefore could be part of a nationwide defensive net. The Soviets' countercharge is weak because the new American radars are on the periphery of the U.S., as the treaty requires.

New Missiles. The SALT II treaty of 1979 permits each side one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile. The U.S. has chosen as its new type the MX, a ten-warhead successor to the three-warhead Minuteman III, although the MX program has been the object of intense controversy and may be killed by the Congress. The Soviets are developing a roughly comparable rocket called the SS-24, and they have officially notified the U.S. that this is to be their one new type.

But the Soviets are working on another ICBM. It is smaller than the SS-24 and may be armed with only one warhead. They claim it is a "modernization" of an old 1960s-vintage ICBM, the SS-13. The U.S. intelligence community has been monitoring the testing program and is convinced that there are too many improvements for the rocket to qualify as a modernization. It is, say U.S. experts, definitely a second new type, which they have dubbed the SS-25. But the definition of a new type in SALT II is imprecise, and some analysts think the Soviet rocket may fit through a loophole that allows a second new type as long as it is sufficiently similar in size and other characteristics to an existing ICBM.

A Soviet diplomat in Washington recently argued that the U.S. is in no position to be a stickler on this issue, since the Administration and Congress are talking about developing a second new type of ICBM: the small, mobile, single-warhead Midgetman.

"It is important to separate the real compliance issues from the red herrings," says Thomas Longstreth of the Arms Control Association, a private educational group in Washington. "The Krasnoyarsk radar and SS-25 are real issues. I don't think there is any doubt that the Soviets are playing hardball with us, showing us what they can do if arms control breaks down completely. By some of their actions, they are saying, in some crude way, 'If it's an arms race

you want, it's an arms race you're going to get.'"

Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, believes that the U.S. must press charges against the Soviets if there is to be any progress in arms control. "There's no question," he says, "the Soviets are violating commitments they have undertaken. Their violations are to various degrees and in various areas. To be serious about arms control, we have to be serious about compliance. When one side abides by its commitments but the other side doesn't, then what's really happening is unilateral disarmament by the first side, under the guise of arms control."



The Administration has been at odds with itself over compliance since its first days in office. In his initial press conference as President, on Jan. 29, 1981, Reagan said the Soviets "reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat." Among the newly appointed officials who took that statement very literally was David Sullivan, a former CIA analyst who had made a career of documenting alleged Soviet violations of SALT. He served briefly in the ACDA in the State Department building.

Sullivan was an ally of Perle's in the bureaucratic struggle, but he was on the wrong side of the Potomac. He ran afoul of colleagues in ACDA and State when he tried to get the Administration to sanction what one official recalls as "a laundry list of every Soviet misdeed since the birth of Lenin, all of them branded as arms-control violations." He was fired from ACDA in March 1981 but has remained an active, though largely

invisible, protagonist in the battle over arms control as an adviser to three conservative Republican Senators: James McClure and Steven Symms of Idaho and Jesse Helms of North Carolina.

Last January, largely in response to pressure from that group, the Administration issued a report on Soviet compliance. It detailed seven Soviet "violations and probable violations" but cautioned that in three of the seven cases the evidence was inconclusive.

A variety of outside experts challenged those findings, arguing that the evidence was less than conclusive in all seven cases. But the hard-liners felt that the Administration had let the Soviets off easy. Perle stressed at the time that the report was "illustrative only," suggesting that there were many more charges to come. Sullivan told TIME last week, "We were pleased that for the first time a President formally charged the Soviets with violating a strategic-arms treaty, but we thought the report could have been stronger."

In October, the trio of right-wing Senators engineered the release of a much more hard-hitting report prepared not by the Administration but by a panel of outsiders—the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC), composed of private citizens, most of whom are hawks and arms-control skeptics. Their study, based heavily on data gathered and interpreted by Sullivan, found the Soviets guilty of 17 "material breaches" of nine treaties and four international commitments. The GAC also cited ten "suspected violations."

Reagan had sat on the GAC report for ten months. When he finally forwarded it to Capitol Hill in October, he stopped short of endorsing its conclusions. He said in a covering letter that the report had been neither reviewed nor approved by the Government. "The GAC report was a hot potato," recalls a White House official. "We couldn't embrace the thing even if we believed it, because to do so would be the kiss of death for arms control, to which the President is really committed. How can we continue trying to negotiate with the Soviets if everything that the GAC report says was true?"

That, in a nutshell, is a dilemma the Administration still faces. The report due this week is a congressionally mandated update on the one the Administration released in January. Sullivan last week warned that his patrons would not be pleased if McFarlane tried to delay the new study or "distance the President from it the way he did with the GAC report. We expect a larger menu of SALT violations than we got in January. We hope not to see a report that is watered

down and full of divided opinion."

Congress requires another report from the Administration in February on the related issue of whether the U.S. should continue to comply with SALT while it tries to negotiate better agreements. There, too, opinion is divided. The hard-liners would like to see SALT dead and buried, while the State Department and its allies argue that the U.S. will be worse off, both diplomatically and militarily, if it pulls the plug on the treaty.

Both superpowers are hedging their bets by proceeding with new military programs that will confront them with stark choices about whether to maintain even the pretense of compliance. The U.S. is facing that dilemma almost immediately. The nuclear-powered submarine *U.S.S. Alaska* is due to be launched by the Electric Boat Division of the General Dynamics Corp. in Groton, Conn., next month; it will begin sea trials in the fall. With that boat in service, the U.S. may, for the first time, be definitively and deliberately in violation of SALT.

Among the ceilings established by SALT II is a limit of 1,200 launchers for long-range ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The *Alaska's* 24 Trident rockets, each with eight thermonuclear warheads, would put the American total of MIRVed ballistic-missile launchers at 1,214.

To avoid violating SALT II, the U.S. would have to take out of service one of its 31 older, smaller Poseidon submarines or remove some land-based Minuteman III ICBMs. In the past, as new U.S. weapons have been deployed, older ones have been dismantled or converted to other uses. For example, the five-year SALT I agreement on offensive weapons, which Nixon signed in 1972, limits the number of submarine tubes each side can have. During the 1970s, as the U.S. Navy built Poseidons, it would dismantle their predecessors and display the pieces on docks so that Soviet spy satellites could see proof that the U.S. was staying within the SALT I limits. This practice continued even after SALT I expired in 1977. The Soviets have done much the same.

Compliance with SALT II is a trickier matter for the Reagan Administration. The Senate never ratified the treaty, and even if it had done so, the pact would expire at the end of next year. Reagan campaigned against SALT II as "fatally flawed." Throughout his first term, informal observance of the expired SALT I agreement on offensive weapons and the unratified SALT II treaty was explained as an "interim restraint," a stopgap that would give the U.S. a chance to negotiate new agreements and to head off what military planners call "breakout." That is what happens when one side unilaterally declares itself no longer bound by arms control and suddenly fields large numbers

of new, threatening and hitherto prohibited weapons.

In 1982 Reagan hoped to improve on SALT in what he called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. But after 18 months of mutual stonewalling in Geneva, those negotiations collapsed a year ago when the Soviets went home and refused to set a date for resumption. With START stalled, the interim restraint has turned out to be open-ended, and it may have to last for a long time to come—well beyond the expiration of SALT II—if arms control is to survive. Some hard-liners seem to be hoping that a tough compliance report this week will set the scene for an Administration recommendation in February not to abide by SALT.

There is good reason to worry about what will happen to the military balance

requires, or whether they will keep all their old rockets and build new launchers for the new missiles. They could also deploy their other new missile, the smaller SS-25, by building new launchers for it rather than retiring older missiles. They would be doing so in defiance of SALT but gaining a major military advantage in the process. These would be classic cases of breakout. The Congressional Research Service, which supplies members of Congress with background reports and analysis on policy, has estimated that with SALT still in force, formally or otherwise, the Soviets would have increased their strategic weapons from about 10,000 today to about 14,000 by 1994 while without SALT they could have about 30,000. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that the breakout figure would be closer to 40,000.

Soviet decisions could depend in part on American ones. The U.S. is continuing with a number of military programs that the Soviets regard as extremely threatening. One is the Trident submarine program, of which the *Alaska* is the seventh boat in an open-ended series. Another is the President's Star Wars plan for a space-based system to defend the U.S. against a Soviet nuclear attack. The Administration has said that it will accelerate its research on Star Wars in a way that does not contravene the 1972 ABM treaty, which is the only strategic arms-control agreement still formally in force. But that treaty prohibits the development as well as the testing and deployment of space-based defenses. The chief Soviet negotiator in START, Viktor Karpov, complained to his American counterpart, Edward Rowny, last year that the very announcement of the Star Wars program was a violation of the spirit of the ABM treaty.

The Soviets have a vigorous ABM research program of their own, including work on technologies like laser beams. Their radar at Krasnoyarsk could very well turn out to be part of an ABM network. They are poised on the starting line—and perhaps ready to jump the gun—if the U.S. seems committed to a space race.

That is just what worries many critics of Star Wars: the quest for an impenetrable defense will provoke the Soviets into adding offensive weapons while at the same time trying to develop extensive defenses of their own.

Thus the arms race and the attempt to regulate it are at a turning point. In 1985 either the superpowers will continue to observe SALT as they negotiate toward something better, or the combination of military pressures and political ill feeling will bring the already shaky arms-control edifice crashing down. The choice could be between a continuation of interim restraints and a massive case of breakout on both sides.

—By Strobe Talbott



if that view prevails. The Soviets have shown a menacing eagerness to accelerate the buildup of their own arsenal when the arms-control process breaks down. Since leaving START, they have deployed new long-range and intermediate-range weapons against the U.S. and its allies. Whether those deployments prove irreversible or whether they turn out to be bargaining chips that might be traded away in future negotiations, they have complicated the prospects for arms control.

Also, the Soviet Union, like the U.S., is bumping its head against an important SALT II ceiling. Each side is allowed under the treaty 820 launchers for ICBMs with MIRVs. The Soviets have 818. Their new ten-warhead SS-24 may be ready for deployment next year. There is concern among American planners over whether the Soviets will put the SS-24 in existing underground silos, replacing the older ones already there, as SALT II

U.S. Delays Release of Report On Soviet Arms Compliance

NYT

Special to The New York Times

28 Nov 84

WASHINGTON, Nov. 27 — White House officials said today that they had decided to put off the release of a new report until next February on purported Soviet arms-control violations that was scheduled to be made public on Saturday.

This means that the report, said to detail some 19 possible Soviet violations, will not be released before Secretary of State George P. Shultz meets with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union in Geneva on Jan. 7-8.

But the White House officials, aware that they would be accused of trying to cover up the Soviet violations to improve the atmosphere for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, denied strongly that they were delaying the report for such motives. They said that the study, requested by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees by Dec. 1, was not complete.

The White House is also required to send to Congress additional studies on Soviet compliance with previous arms control accords on Feb. 1 and Feb. 15.

The Most Logical Thing to Do'

Because of the multiple requests, a White House official said this afternoon, "it would appear that the most logical thing to do and the most doable thing is to combine the Dec. 1 report with the other mandated Congressional requests and to report in one rather comprehensive report in February."

Earlier, a Senate aide said the White House was under pressure from the State Department to delay issuing the report on Dec. 1 because of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting. But a White House official said that "lest anyone think it is State Department pressuring the White House, we would have more concern about the atmosphere being poisoned once the negotiating process starts."

He insisted that the decision to put off

the report was made by the specialists on the National Security Council staff, who asserted that they were already overworked in having to prepare for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

The report that was due on Dec. 1 had been called for in a conference report of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the fiscal year 1985 military authorization bill. It was supposed to detail Soviet violations as they might affect the deployment of a new American MX missile that is due to be voted on by Congress next March.

Because the request is only in the conference report and not in the legislation itself, there was no legal requirement for the Administration to comply, Administration and Congressional sources said.

WPost
28 Nov 84

Reagan Said to See Star Wars Curbing Nuclear Offensive

Associated Press

President Reagan hopes to persuade the Soviet Union in renewed arms-control talks that his Star Wars defense initiative is a feasible way to sharply reduce or eliminate nuclear offensive arms by making them obsolete, his chief spokesman said yesterday.

Presidential spokesman Larry Speakes also said that the United States and the Soviet Union now appear to be on the same general arms-control track.

Speakes told reporters that a statement Monday by Soviet President Konstantin U. Chernenko that future arms talks should cover "the entire complex of interconnected questions of nonmilitarization of outer space" and reductions in both strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles "appears to be consistent" with the U.S. approach.

The Soviets have expressed in-

tense interest in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons into space while the Reagan administration has pressed forward with research aimed at demonstrating whether a space defense system could protect against a nuclear attack.

Speakes was asked whether the United States intends to try to persuade the Soviets that an effective space-based defensive system holds out the prospect of greater nuclear stability.

"That is certainly our position," he replied. "And we will make those views known to the Soviets."

Critics of the Star Wars initiative argue that it is technologically impossible and would violate the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty.

At the Pentagon, spokesman Michael Burch said the initiative "is a concept that we are looking at."

"We don't think it interferes with arms control," he said.

Chernenko Delineates Arms Talks

Soviet Includes Medium-Range, Strategic Weapons

By Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 26—Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko today said future arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union should cover both strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, the two areas in which the Soviet Union broke off talks with the United States almost a year ago.

Chernenko's statement, made during a meeting today with British Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock and published by the Soviet news agency Tass, was his first since the announcement last week that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George P. Shultz will meet in Geneva in January.

Chernenko said the Soviet Union wants "to start negotiations on the entire complex of interconnected questions of nonmilitarization of outer space, reduction of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear weapons."

He noted that the Soviet Union "is prepared to search for the most radical solutions" in order to achieve "the complete prohibition and ultimately . . . the liquidation of nuclear arms."

This, he said, was the thrust of a Soviet proposal recently sent to President Reagan.

By explicitly citing strategic and medium-range weapons, Chernenko expanded on a Foreign Ministry statement four days ago that said only that the Soviets were willing to discuss "the entire complex of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons." And by specifically mentioning Soviet willingness to negotiate on medium-range nuclear weapons now, Chernenko's statement broke with previous Soviet declarations that demanded that American

cruise and Pershing II missiles be withdrawn from Western Europe as a condition for new talks.

The Soviets broke off negotiations on medium-range weapons in Geneva last December after the deployment in Western Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Strategic arms reduction talks were suspended by the Soviets the same month.

In his comments today, Chernenko made no mention of withdrawal of the missiles or other conditions. However, he noted that the question of Soviet missiles deployed in Eastern Europe as a countermeasure "can be decided only with taking into consideration the further actions of the U.S. side."

A ban on nuclear weapons in outer space has long been a top Soviet priority. But a proposal this summer for negotiations on space weapons collapsed after the Soviets balked at U.S. efforts to broaden the scope of the talks, and after the United States objected to Soviet demands for a moratorium on testing.

Chernenko's call for talks on "the entire complex" of arms control issues closely parallels Reagan's suggestion at the United Nations last September for "umbrella talks" on wide-ranging arms issues.

Kinnock and other opposition Labor Party figures, who met with Chernenko for 1½ hours and more briefly with Gromyko, said later that the Soviet leaders seemed to emphasize a new approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.

"The new thinking seemed to be an effort to make very broad initiatives in order to try to restore relations to where they were in the late 1970s," Kinnock told a group of British journalists.

"What is new is their readiness to talk without conditions," he said. Denis Healey, a foreign secretary under the Labor government, said the Soviets are looking for a "fresh start," according to reporters present.

Chernenko also told the Labor Party leaders that the Soviet Union would scrap its missiles aimed at Britain if a future Labor government carried out the party's pledge to dismantle nuclear weapons there.

A similar offer was extended to Labor Party leaders by the late Soviet president Yuri Andropov in 1983. The Labor Party adopted its policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament last September.

Staff writer Don Oberdorfer reported from Washington:

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt, discussing the Shultz-Gromyko talks, said on the NBC program "Today" that "we'd like to get the negotiations actually started in Geneva in January" and "we will be working to that end."

His statement suggested a more ambitious aim for the talks than the search for "a common understanding as to the subjects and objectives" of arms control negotiations, as set forth in Thursday's joint U.S.-Soviet announcement.

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1984

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Arms control chronology: last November's walkout to this month's 'let's talk'

Nov. 23, 1983: Soviet negotiators walk out of intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) talks in Geneva.

Dec. 8, 1983: US and Soviet negotiators hold last session of strategic arms reduction talks (START). Soviets set no date for resumption.

Dec. 15, 1983: NATO-Warsaw Pact mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna adjourn with no date set for resumption.

Jan. 1, 1984: British defense ministry announces that the first NATO cruise missiles deployed in that country are operational.

Jan. 10, 1984: Soviets call for NATO-Warsaw Pact talks aimed at banning chemical weapons in Europe.

Jan. 22, 1984: US Secretary of State George P. Shultz announces that MBFR talks will resume in March.

Jan. 23, 1984: President Reagan submits to Congress a report alleging Soviet violations of past arms control pacts.

Jan. 29, 1984: Soviets accuse US of arms control violations.

Jan. 30, 1984: US START negotiator Edward L. Rowny says the US is "prepared to consider" merging INF and START talks.

Feb. 21, 1984: Soviets say they would allow continuous verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks if a pact is reached to ban chemical weapons.

April 2, 1984: President Reagan tells Congress he sees little use in trying to negotiate a comprehensive ban on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons with Soviets.

April 2, 1984: NATO cruise missiles based in Sicily become operational.

April 18, 1984: US Vice-President George Bush unveils draft treaty on a comprehensive worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

May 10, 1984: Danish parliament votes to stop paying for NATO cruise and Pershing II missiles, becoming the first country to withdraw from NATO deployment plan.

May 20, 1984: Soviets announce they have increased the number of missile-carrying submarines off the US coast and pledge to increase deployment of SS-20 medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter NATO deployment.

May 21-22, 1984: West German foreign minister visits Moscow and reports that there is no chance of resuming arms talks until after US elections. Soviets call for removal of cruise and Pershing-II missiles from Europe and a halt to future deployment as a precondition to resumption of INF talks.

June 1, 1984: Dutch cabinet votes to delay a decision on deployment of NATO cruise missiles in the Netherlands until Nov. 1, 1985.

June 27, 1984: US Navy announces deployment of first long-range cruise missiles at sea.

June 29, 1984: Soviets propose formal talks with US on banning weapons in outer space and says both sides should impose a moratorium on testing such weapons when the talks open. US expresses its interest, but says such talks should be linked with a resumption of talks covering nuclear arms reductions.

July 1, 1984: Soviets reject linkage, but keep offer open for a September starting date for talks on space weapons.

July 14, 1984: Reagan administration officials say US accepts September starting time for space weapons talks, but offers to postpone them until after the elections, if the Soviet desire.

July 17, 1984: US and Soviets initial an agreement to update the crisis "hot line" between the two countries.

July 21, 1984: USSR submits a draft statement formally committing both sides to begin space weapons talks.

July 24, 1984: The US responds with its own draft statement.

July 27, 1984: Soviets reject US draft statement, saying it lacks specificity on what is to be discussed.

Sept. 1, 1984: Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko says agreement on space weapons "would facilitate the solution of questions of limiting and reducing other strategic armaments" but criticizes the US for not agreeing to a mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons, including ASATS.

Sept. 9, 1984: Secretary of State Shultz rejects Soviet calls for moratorium on space-weapons testing in advance of talks.

Sept. 24, 1984: President Reagan addresses UN General Assembly and says the US and Soviet Union need "to extend the arms control process to build a bigger umbrella under which it can operate — a road map, if you will, showing where in the next 20 years or so these individual efforts can lead."

Sept. 28-29, 1984: President Reagan meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. They discuss Reagan's "umbrella" concept for arms control talks and agree on a process for future meetings. Reagan indicates the US would be willing to accept restraints on space-weapons testing if space weapons talks were held, but he also stressed the need to focus on all areas of arms control.

Oct. 16, 1984: Chernenko reiterates calls for a ban on space weapons, a mutual freeze on building nuclear weapons, US ratification of test-ban treaties the two countries signed in 1974 and 1976, and a US pledge not to be the first to launch a nuclear attack.

Oct. 10, 1984: The White House issues another report on Soviet treaty violations, repeating much of the material in the January report.

Nov. 22, 1984: US and Soviets announce a plan to resume arms control talks on Jan. 7.

Difficult decisions lie ahead

THE BOSTON GLOBE FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1984

By William Beecher
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON — The Soviet-American agreement to enter talks on nuclear and space weapons represents, potentially, a mile-

NEWS ANALYSIS stone in efforts to curb the arms race.

But Washington and Moscow will have to make difficult decisions and compromises if the promise of a resumption of talks is to lead to successful negotiations.

By agreeing to meet in Geneva in January for policy discussions to conclude the agendas for technical arms control negotiations, each side already has compromised.

Late last year when the Soviets walked out of separate Geneva talks on medium range and strategic missiles, they vowed not to return to the bargaining table until

the United States pulled out the Pershing 2 ballistic and Tomahawk cruise missiles being deployed in West Germany, Britain and Italy. Nearly 100 such medium range missiles, out of a projected force of 572, are installed.

In addition the Russians declined last summer to meet the United States in Vienna for Soviet-proposed space weapon negotiations when the United States insisted on dealing there with offensive as well as defensive weapons and offered to discuss, but not negotiate, antisatellite weapons without any reference to space defense weapons, which are a greater Soviet concern.

The Soviets now appear to be softening on their stand. But, the United States, too, has changed its position by agreeing not only to discuss but also to set up negotiations on "outer space arms." Given President Ronald Reagan's desire to pursue so-called star wars defensive weaponry and the Pentagon's previous unwillingness even to discuss such weapons at the bargaining table, yesterday's announcement suggests a possibly large step forward.

Robert C. McFarlane, the President's national security adviser who announced the agreement, told reporters the US has some time to

work, prepared its positions and "we're ready to go."

But the most difficult presidential decisions have not been made, and those undoubtedly will be the subject of fierce intramural struggle over the next several weeks by a number of determined players who have very different ideas of what will best serve US national interests.

While most elements of the bureaucracy are willing to enter separate negotiations over antisatellite weapons there is a wide divergence of opinion over what might be prudently limited.

But much more difficult is an internal debate over whether the United States should be willing to even enter negotiations over limits on new technologies for space defense that could destroy the other side's missiles and warheads in flight.

Since research into high energy lasers and charged particle beams is still in its early stages, the Defense Department has been

adamantly opposed negotiating constraints on systems before their feasibility has been determined. Other officials, both in the White House and State Department, favor discussing and perhaps negotiating with the Russians some modification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 to permit limited defenses of missile silos.

President's choice

From all the public utterances of the President since his star wars speech of last year, he would appear to instinctively favor the Pentagon approach, both not wanting to forgo heavy nationwide defenses if the technology shows they are feasible, affordable and — if deployed mutually — stabilizing.

But the Soviets are fearful of a technological race in space in which their offensive missile arsenal, built at great expense over the last two decades, might be ineffective in face of a massive, multi-layered American defensive

shield. The Russians could well argue that the essence of the American position — to substantially cut down the number of warheads and missile payload — would diminish the additional warheads that the Russians might need to penetrate the heavy American defense.

Similarly, the President has not made a choice between two very different approaches to Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The Pentagon would prefer to stick with an offer to cut way back on systems where the United States has an advantage — long range bombers carrying cruise missiles — for a deep reduction in the force of larger Soviet SS18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could be armed with two or three times the number of warheads now permitted.

Package of limits

The State Department, however, would prefer to offer a package of limits and sublimits on nuclear launchers and warheads, which would be similar to the approach taken in SALT 1 and SALT 2, on the premise this would be closer to the Russian preference and would offer a greater chance of being successfully negotiated.

Furthermore, no decision has been made on whether to try to resume separate negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces governing the Pershing 2, Tomahawk and Soviet SS20 medium range missiles, or try to fold those into START talks.

The Russians, who since 1979 have pursued a strategy aimed at preventing deployment of any US medium range missiles by encouraging antinuclear movements in Western Europe, would have to concede the total failure of that strategy by coming back to INF talks while missiles continued to be deployed.

Politically, the admission of such a failure would seem to be a failure for powerful Politburo figures, such as Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, who are among its most prominent authors. That, in turn, could have significant impact in the struggle for leadership in the Kremlin.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1984 / PAGE 3A

19 Soviet violations on weapons listed by White House report

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House will inform Congress this weekend that there have been a total of 19 Soviet violations of nuclear arms control agreements — a dozen more than were reported in January, administration officials said yesterday.

The report will reinforce the January conclusion that there has been "a disturbing pattern" of Soviet arms control violations through the years, said the officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In a letter being prepared for delivery by a Saturday deadline requested by Congress, White House national security adviser Robert McFarlane will inform Congress of the violations, the officials said.

Congressional sources said the letter will be accompanied by a classified "interim report" of the violations, which will not be made public until February. The conference report on this year's defense authorization bill called for a report to be made public by Dec. 1.

The new administration report is in addition to one done by a White House sponsored panel of outside experts — the General Advisory Committee on Disarmament.

Made public last month, the GAC committee report found 17 violations over the last 25 years and 10 further "suspicions of material breach." Many of the GAC violations overlap those found in the official administration reports, officials said.

State...feared the report would lessen support for arms control agreements

Release of the new violations report, the congressional sources said, "has been fought by the State Department which feared the report would lessen congressional and public support for new arms control agreements with the Soviets."

Even though the Saturday deadline has not been met completely, some congressional conservatives see the letter and the secret report as a victory.

"The White House response represents a solid victory for the senators who have insistently lobbied for the report for several years now," said Sen. Steve Symms, R-Idaho, in a statement.

He said the American people deserve to know if the Soviets have been meeting their obligations to world peace.

White House spokesman Robert Sims confirmed that a letter is being prepared for Mr. McFarlane informing Congress that an analysis of 12 additional possible violations is under way.

Mr. Sims did not know if a description of the 12 additional "issues" would be included in the letter or even would accompany it. The analysis has not yet been completed, Mr. Sims said. He said the additional violations would be officially reported to Congress in February.

Since the Dec. 1 deadline was included only in a conference report and not in legislation, it did not have the force of law, and was more of a "request" by Congress, Mr. Sims said.

In the authorization bill itself, which has the force of law, Congress required the administration to inform it by Feb. 15 of Soviet compliance with the 1972 ABM treaty and the 1979 Salt II agreement. (Both nations have said they would comply with Salt II even though it has never been ratified by the U.S. Senate as a formal treaty.)

Mr. Sims said the administration felt it was therefore complying with the law and demonstrating a good faith effort to meet the request of Congress.


Other officials described the 12 additional violations being analyzed as:

- Limited test ban treaty violations.
- The building of movable anti-ballistic missile radars, not allowed under the 1972 ABM treaty.
- The testing of surface-to-air missile radars and interceptors in an ABM mode, also forbidden under the 1972 treaty.
- The prohibited "rapid reload" of missile interceptors.
- Production of Backfire manned bombers at a rate above the 30 per month called for in the Salt II agreement.
- Provision for more than the 10 warheads on the giant SS-18 missile agreed on in the Salt II accord.
- Soviet failure to dismantle the total number of nuclear delivery vehicles called for in Salt II.
- The testing of a "heavy" submarine-launched ballistic missile — the SSN-X-23 — in violation of Salt II.
- The stationing and refueling of Backfire bombers in the Arctic in violation of Salt II.
- Plans to station the Backfire in Cuba in violation of the so-called Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement after the 1963 Cuban missile crisis.
- Violation of the Salt II multiple warhead ceiling by the recent deployment of the new SS-25 ICBM, capable of carrying three warheads, and the anticipated deployment soon of the SS-24, which will be able to carry 10 nuclear warheads.
- The jamming of U.S. satellites and radars monitoring Soviet missile tests, monitoring needed to verify the number of warheads a missile can carry as well as other characteristics.

— Walter Andrews

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

Attached are revised pieces of the DCI Briefing Book for the NSPG meeting on 30 November. Please remove the older materials and replace them with the new materials in the appropriate place. Thanks.



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